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The Role of Venture Capital Financing in
Inflating the Technology Stock Market Bubble

Jessica Rosenbloom
Economic Honors Thesis
May 15,2002

Comprising nearly one-third of the nation's gross domestic product from 1995 to 1999,
the growth of the Infonnation Technology industry took a backseat to dot.com mania. Its
companies, however. were just as influential in creating the stock market bubble.
Characterized by high technology, high research and development, high profits, and high
risk, the Infonnation Technology industry had always been attractive to venture capital
investors. This study will find that a Telecommunications Deregulation Act passed in
1996, in conjunction with an eight percent capital gains tax cut in 1997. flooded venture
capitalists with business plans pertaining to the Infonnation Technology industry. It will
also find that this surge in deman~ in conjunction with an equally large inflow of capital,
led to a significant and dangerous change in venture capital investment behavior. The
study will fmd that venture capitalists forced financing rounds close together allowing for
an increase of capital to each investment and a decrease of time to perform proper due
diligence. These poorly supervised but highly funded investments were then brought to
initial public offering with pre-money valuations reflecting their potential market growth,
not their financial status. The problem with these generated growth rates was that they
were based on highly specUlative information, as many new markets emerged during the
late 1990s. This study will show that tbe change in venture capital behavior saturated a
market with over valued and poorly modeled businesses, leading to the eventual burst of
the stock market bubble.
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Introduction
Many look to the initial public offering of Netscape as the start of the late 1990s
stock market bubble. t

In fact, looking at the S&P500 PIE ratios 2, there is a steady

increase in the PIE ratios beginning in the first quarter of 1995, only a mere month after
the Netscape !PO.

J

The increase continues through the second quarter of 1999. Using

PIE ratios as a measure of market value, the increase in market value places the bubble
from 1995 through the second quarter of 1999.
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And while many refer to this bubble as

the Internet Bubble, they fail to realize that the Information Technology sector made up
nearly one-third of the nation's gross domestic product during the exact same time
period. 1995 through mid-1999. 5 As the Internet boomed with each new dOLcom initial
public offering (IPO), so too did the Information Technology sector, as it attempted to
keep up

to

date with the newest technology. In fact, it would appear that as the Internet

market grew, the Information Technology sector matched its growth, driven by American
demand for the Internet to perform everyday tasks.

And at the center of this ever-

growing bubble, were the venture capitaliSts.
Starting in the late 1960s, the venture capital industry was the answer many
entrepreneurs had been looking for.

Focusing their investments on high-risk, high-

technology, and high-research-and-development projects. the venture capitalists provided
funding where banks would never go. Rather than require their loaned money to be paid
I Perkins. Anthony B. and Michael C. Perkins. The Internet Bubble: The inside story on why it burst-and
what you can do to profit now. pg.54.
2 The PIE ratio is the ratio of a company's price per share to its earnings per share. A company's earnings
per share are calculated by dividing the after tax profits of a company by the amount of its outstanding
shares. PIE ratios are generally used to measure the value a market places on a stock.
) See Appendix Graph A-l
~ There has yet to be discovered an exact formula for defining stock market bubbles. This paper uses a
significant run-up in stock market value over a fairly shan period of time. as the grounds for defining the
1995-1999 stock market bubble.
j Cassidy, John. dot.con: The Gre.1test Story Ever Sold. pg.250.
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back with some level of interest, as banks do, venture capitalisls instead, look to earn a
return on their investment by owning of a signjficant portion of the company through
stock options and board seats. Therefore, the venture capitalists will only see a return
from their investments when their companies reach an initial public offering, allowing the
investors to exercise options and gain money as the company's market price soars. It has
been a fairly successful industry, boasting an average 23 percent return for nearly thirty
years. 6 And while the industry did experience several surges, the Biotechnology boom
being the most recent, it never saw anything quite like the returns of late 1990s, which
were between 50 and 150 percent.

7

And while the growing Internet industry did lend itself to the growth of the
Information Technology sector, certain other market conditions, more specifically a
deregulation of the Telecommunications industry and a capital gains tax cut, provided a
nearly perfect capital supply and demand market for venture capitalists. Under careful
government scrutiny, the Telecommunications industry got a big break in 1996 when the
Telecommunications Deregulation Act was passed. As an industry with new freedom
and fewer constraints, a market previously closed off to entrepreneurs had its doors wide
open.

These entrepreneurs received their big break in 1997 when the government

provided them with a capital gains tax break, cutting the rate by eight percentage points
for those in the long-term tax bracket. Since an entrepreneur's income is considered a

Perkins, Anthony B. and Michael C. Perkins. The Internet Bubble: The inside story on why it burst-and
what you can do to profit now. pg.65.
7 Perkins, Anthony B. and Michael C. Perkins. The Internet Bubble: The inside slory on why it burst-and
what you can do to profit now. pg.65.
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capital gain, the tax cut acted as an income taX break for the entrepreneur and an added
incentive for the inveslOr. s
As the new business plans flowed in. so too did capital from investors, matching
each new deal with potential funds. However, the problem with financing a new and
rapidly growing market. such as the Information Technology sector, is that it is very
difficult to place a bound on the potential market size and consumer demand.

Venture

capitalists generally use information such as a company's profit level, potential market
growth, or even consumer demand as measurements to place a price on the investment.

In the case of many Information Technology companies, venture capital investments
were looking to enter brand new markets and were barely generating profits. Unable to
measure the potential growth of these markets, venture capitalists had very little
information on which to value the incoming business plans for Information Technology
companies. Instead of holding onto the capital that they had received from investors,
veOlure capitalists invested this money into the highly risky but potentially highly
profitable business plans. They generally valued these companies at very high levels,
using new measures, such as the value of a company to its consumers, to justify the
investments. The venture capitalists then nursed these companies through development,
providing unprecedented amounts of capital in a very short period of time. When the
companies were brought to lPO. very few were generating profits and most likely would
not be for a couple of years.
Th..is paper examines the exact role that venture capital financings played in
inflating the stock market bubble that existed from 1995 through the second quarter of
1999.
g

The venture capital data for thjs analysis was obtained from a VentureOne

POlerba, James. "Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation."
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database of 143 venture capital-backed Information Technology companies that reached
IPO between 1995 and 2000. Three separate regression models will be used to examine
the conditions that drove venture capitalists to invest in panicuJar companies, the
characteristics used to value each company at its IPO, as well as the impact of a "hot
issues" market9 on the decision to go public. Through this analysis, this paper will find
that optimal market conditions did lead to a change in venture capital investment
behavior, causing a decrease in the time between financing rounds. This decrease lead to
a lack of time to perform proper due diligence. and a rush to !PO in order to take
advantage of a "hot issues" market 10.

Characteristics of the Venture Capital Industry
As a fairly new industry, venture capital has drawn much interest but few concrete
theoretical studies. The reasons for this vary greatly. For one, venture capital firms are
private and up until IPO, their investments are private as well; therefore financial
infonnation is not available via SEC filings. Instead, researchers would have to obtain
this information by calling each venture capital finn individually and asking for access to
its financial information.

Now, there are two databases, VentureOne and Venture

Economics. that make these phone calls for the researchers but charge extremely large
fees for the data. Since these databases are fairly new, so is the data they have access

to.

Therefore, most studies regarding venture capitalists generally apply to current
conditions, such as the 19805 Biotechnology surge.
9 Jay Riner (1998) defines a "hot issue" market as a market where there is an increase in the volume of
initial public offerings. This rise generally occurs after a rise in the average initial returns on IPOs.
Therefore, it appears that the rise in average initial returns creates incentive for more companies to reach
initial public offering.
10 Riner, Jay. ''Initial Public Offerings."

7

The theories used to generate this paper were discovered in three unrelated studies
penaining to venture capitaJ industry behavior during the Biotechnology surge. While
both Biotechnology and Information Technology are high-research and development,
high-risk, and potentially highly profitable they differ in many other respects. So much
so, that many of the models used within these three studies had to be modified
significantly. if not changed completely, in order to apply to the specific characteristics of
the Infonnation Technology industry. Each work aids in explaining a panicular aspect of
this paper.

One study looks at factors generating venture firms' supply and demand

curves for capital. Another study looks at the effects of surges in the supply of capital to
venture capitalists' valuations of their investments. The third study examines particular
market conditions that affect venture capital investment behavior.
While none of the three papers provide answers as to why the stock market bubble
of the late 19905 existed, they do aid in gaining venture capitaJ market perspective as well
as an understanding of venture capitaJ behavior. This information will then be used to
generate methods that are capable of measuring subsequent changes in venture capital
behavior and the impact of these changes on the valuations and quality of their
investments.

Venture Capital Supply aTUi Demand/or Capital
It appears that both the supply and demand for capital, following the 1996
Telecommunications Deregulation Act and the 1997 capital gains tax cut, played a major
role in detennining venture capital investment behavior during the stock market bubble
that existed from 1995 through mid-1999.

8

Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner (1998)

examined the role that capital gains tax rates as well as several other market and fund
specific variables played in affecting venture capital fundraising.

Using a series of

multivariate regressions divided into sub-sectors for four investing groups, Gompers and
Lerner determine whether particular variables cause supply-side or demand-side affects
on the flow of capital commitments to venture funds.
In their study, Gompers and Lerner divide investments in venture capital funds
into fouf groups: the taxable investments, the tax-exempt investments, the individual
investments, and penSIOn fund investments.

Gompers and Lerner then estimate a

regression using the natural logarithm of commitments to the venture capital industry in
1994 dollars as the dependent variable. They then regress the natural logan thm of the
value of all venture capital-backed IPOs in the previous year measured in 1994 dollars,
the previous year's gross domestic product (GDP) growth, the previous year's t-bill
return, the previous year's equity market return, a dummy variable equal to one for those
in vestments made after the clarification of the prudent man rule II, and the capital gains
tax rate.
Through these regressions, Gompers and Lerner determine that the capital gains
tax rate has a significant and negative affect on the demand for capital, with its effect
strongest for those contributions from pension funds. This finding is consistent with
James Poterba's (1989) suggestion that lower capital gains tax rates influence the
decision for individuals to pursue entrepreneurial behavior. An entrepreneur's income is
merely the capital gains earned from the equity of the company, therefore a capital gains
tax cut acts like an income tax for entrepreneurs creating incentive to pursue a project.

II The clarification of the "prudenl roan" rule allowed pension funds to invest. without restrainls, in venture
capilal funds.
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Looking at macroeconomjc variables that may exist either as alternative forms of
investment for venture capital funds, such as t-bill return rates and equity market returns,
or as key indicators of the economy's wealth, such as GDP, Gompers and Lerner find that
the real rate of growth of GDP proved to have the largest affect on capital commitments
to venture funds. Increases in the real rate of growth of GDP have a positive affect on
both the supply and demand for capital to and from venture funds. An increase in the real
rate of growth of GDP, will increase opportunities for entrepreneurs, and thereby increase
the amount of business plans flowing into venture finns.
Using these findings, Gompers and Lerner estimate a second regression to
determine what factors affect a venture capital firm's decision to raise a fund. If a fund is
raised they use a modified list of variables to determine what factors impact its size. For
the first equation, Gompers and Lerner use a dummy variable equal to one if a fund was
raised as the dependent variable.

The independent variables include the years since

raising the last fund, the square of the number of years since raising the last fund, the age
of the venture organjzation, the value of equity held in firms brought public in the current
year, the total value of firms brought public in the previous year by all venture capitalists,
the real GDP growth in the previous year, the t-bill return in the previous year, the return
on the CRSP value weighted index 12 in the previous year, the capital gains tax rate, and a
dummy variable equal to one for those funds raised after the clarification of the "prudent
man" rule. If a fund is raised, then Gompers and Lerner estimate a second regression
with the natural logarithm of the fund size in 1994 dollars as the dependent variable. The
independent variables Gompers and Lerner use in this equation are the years since raising
the last fund, the square of the number of years since raising the last fund, the age of the
12

The CRSP value-weighted index reflects stock market returns for the major indices.
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venture organization, the value of equity held in firms brought public in the current year,
the value of equity held in firms brought public in the previous year, the total value of
finns brought public in the previous year by all venture capitalists, the capital gains tax
rate, and a d.ummy variable equal to one for those funds raised after the clarification of
the "prudent man" rule.
Through these regressions Gompers and Lerner are able to detennine key
decision-making factors.

They find that the age of the venture capital firm and its

previous performance level, as measured by the value of equity held in firms brought
public in the current and previous year, have a largely significant and positive affect on
determining whether or not a venture capital firm will raise a fund and then what the size
of that fund may be. Therefore, it appears that the more experienced and more profitable
firms are, the more likely a finn is to raise a fund and the larger that fund will be.
Gompers and Lerner also find that as the time between funds increases, firms are
more likely to raise a fund and the size of that fund is more likely to be greater. Since
venture capitalists only earn returns on the money they invest, the greater the amount of
time between investments, the longer the fum is sining with uninvested capital. In order
to earn returns. the venture capital firm must invest the accumulating capital. Therefore,
venture capitalists are more likely to take on an investment, and they will invest a larger
amount of capital in the company.
However, when looking at the macroeconomic factors that determine the finn's
decision to raise a fund the real rate of growth of GDP is insignificant. This finding
appears

(0

conflict with Gompers and Lerner's previous finding, which illustrates the real

rate of GDP growth as the key determinant of the supply for capital to venture funds.
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Through their study, Gompers and Lerner are able to detennine key factors that
affect the supply and demand for venture capital. These findings, in conjunction with the
two other studies, will help to specify models later on in this paper.

Venture CapiTal Inflow and Pre-Money Valuations

In their first paper, Gompers and Lerner illustrated that an increase in the demand
for venture capital will, in tum, affect the supply of capital, and therefore, increase the
amount of com.m.itments made to venture capital funds. In a later paper, Paul Gompers
and Josh Lerner (2000) look at the impact of this supply surge on the valuations of a
venture capital firm's new investments. Gompers and Lerner suggest that an increase in
a firm's supply of capital will increase the valuations of their investments.
In order to test their hypothesis. Gompers and Lerner use a hedonic pnce
regression with the logarithm of the pre-money valuation 13 of each investment as the
dependent variable. A hedonic price regression uses characteristics and qualities of a
particular product in an attempt to explain its variations in price.

In Gompers and

Lerner's case they use the pre-money valuation of a company as a proxy for the
company's price

Of

worth. They then take a series of characteristics of each investment

to find which characteristics have a large impact on influencing a company's value. As

their independent variables Gompers and Lerner use a set of dummy variables to
illustrate the stage of each firm at the time of its pre-money valuation l4 , a set of dummy

Gompers and Lerner (2000) define the pre-money valuation of a firm "as the product of the price paid
share in the financing round and the shares oucstanding prior to the financing round (292)."
4 The dummy variables used accounted for those firms in the slMt-up stage, development sLage, bela stage
or testing stage, shipping stage, profitable stage, and restart stage.
13

~r

12

variables to account for the industry of each finn
the location of the investment

16

•

tS

,

a set dummy variables to account for

the log of the firm's age in years, the log of the finn's

sales or log of the firm's employment as a measure of size, the log of the value or equal
weighted industry index, and the log of the inflow of venture capital.
Gompers and Lerner use a data set of 4069 professional venture financings of
privately held finns between January 1987 and December 1995 from the VentureOne
database. Since Gompers and Lerner do not have an accurate measure of a firm's size,
they chose to use either the firm's amount of employees or the firm's amount of sales as a
proxy. Because Gompers and Lerner did not know wtUch measurement would be the
most appropriate, they estimate three separate regressions: one without a measurement
for size, one with the amount of a firm's employees, and one with the amount of the
firm's sales.
All three regressions find that those finns financed during a start-up stage have a
significant and negative effect on their pre-money valuations. Companies financed at a
start-up stage are the most risky investments for a venture capital firm, for they have very
little information in the way of financings or product development. Therefore, it would
only be expected that these start-up companies would have a lower pre-money valuation,
as the company's worth is fairly minimal.

The only other two stages that have a

significant impact on a firm's pre-money valuation are those firms financed in the
profitable stage and restart stage. Those financed in the profitable stage have a positive

IS The dummy variables used for the industry accounted for I.ho~ fmns in the Data Processing indusuy, the
Computer Software industry, the Communications indusuy, the Consumer EleclIonics industry. the
Induslrial Equipment industry, the Medical industry, the Instrumental industry, the Components industry,
and the Semiconductor industry.
16 Gompers and Lerner accounted for those invesuneots located in the Eastern states and those investments
located in the Western stares. leaving oUlthose investments in the middle states to avoid a specification
error.
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impact on pre-money valuations. As a firm is able to develop the capability to generate
profits, more investors will be willing to invest in the company.

A more established

company will generally have a higher worth since its growth prospects are much more
concrete than a start-up. therefore, a higher valuation will be expected.

This result

proved positive and significant throughout all three regressions. Those firms financed in
the restart stage have a negative impact on their pre-money valuations. Firms in a restart
stage are generally regrouping after a failed anempt to stand on their own. Like the start
up companies, the futures of these investments are highly speculative. Therefore, it will
be expected that the company will be worth less, leading to a lower pre-money valuation.
These results proved significant throughout all three regressions.
Gompers and Lerner also look at the role of a firm's industry in its pre-money
valuation. It is found that those firms financed in the Data Processing, Communications.
Medical and Semiconductor industry had a positive and significant impact on their pre
money :valuations.

Therefore, the firms financed in those industries, will have

significantly higher pre-money valuations, with those in the Semiconductor industry
having the highest.
Variables that Gompers and Lerner included to measure the age and size of the
finn are also positive and significant. Therefore. as the age of a firm increases so too will
its pre-money valuation. This finding illustrates that the older the firm financed, the
higher its pre-money valuation.

This seems logical, for the older the finn the more

experienced its staff and the more developed its product may be. Such companies will be
expected to be worth more and would therefore gain a higher pre-money valuation. The
same results hold true for those two variables Gompers and Lerner use to represent firm
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size. Both firm sales and firm employment prove to have a positive and significant effect
on pre-money valuations. As the firm's sales increase or the size of its staff increases so
too will the finn's pre-money valuations. Gompers and Lerner effectively show that a
finn's repuUltion. as measured by its age, and its size, as measured by its sales and
employment levels, will positively affect its pre-money valuations. As explained before
these findings appear quite consistent with conventional wisdom, that is the more
experienced and larger a company

IS,

the more reputable it is, and the greater the

company's wOl1h should be.
Most importantly, Gompers and Lerner look at the impact of changes in the
amount of commined capital to venture funds on an investment's pre-money valuation.
Gompers and Lerner discover that an increase in the amount of capital invested in venture
capital firms increases the pre-money valuations of a firm's investments. Comparing the
pre-money valuations of consecuti ve financing rounds, Gompers and Lerner find that if
the amount of capital commined to a venture capital firm doubles in the time between the
financing founds, then the pre-money valuations of its inveslments increased by eight
percent.

Gompers and Lerner attribute the rise in price to an increase in investment

competition. This finding will be highly relevant later in the paper when looking at the
investment atmosphere during the 1995-1999 stock market bubble.
Through their analysis, Gompers and Lerner are able to determine what factors
playa key role in determining the valuations of venture capital investments.

These

factors will be helpful later in this paper, when looking at the pre-money valuations of
venture capital investments during the defined stock market bubble.
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Influences on Venture Capital Behavior
While the previous two studies have looked to account for what factors affect the
supply and demand for venture capital as well as the valuations of venture capital
investments, Paul Gompers (1995) looks to discover what impact these factors have on
influencing venture capital behavior. Gompers proposes that changes in capit.al inflow to
venture capital firms can change investment behavior.

Gompers relies on Michael

Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory to motivate his analysis. Jensen finds that as firms
come upon increased amounts of capital. they will invest the money in projects that will
earn returns rather than sit with the capital. Therefore, if venture capitalists experience a
large surge in committed capital, it will most likely result in an increase in the frequency
and size of investments. However, Jensen also points to a serious agency cost associated
with free cash flow. The amount

~f

capital associated with free cash flow is generally

significant. With such a large amount of capital to invest, the finn investing usually will
use less discretion in its investment decision-making than would a finn with liquidity
problems.

Since venture capitalists earn the largest returns from money invested,

especially money invested in firms taken to IPO, it seems logical that venture capitalists
will invest the new capital in companies likely to reach lPO. Gompers actually cites a
study in which Blanchard, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) study the role of free
cash flow theory on companies that win lawsuits, finding that this inflow of capital is
actually invested in unsuccessful projects rather than given to shareholders.

If this

change in investment behavior applies to venture funds inundated with new committed
capital, then the venture capital firms active in the time period slightly before and during

16

the stock market bubble of the late 1990s could have made poor investment decisions,
saturating the markets with potentially faulty companies.
Using a sample of 2143 financing rounds for 794 venture capital-backed finns
from 1975 to 1989, Gompers first analyzes the industry composition of venture capital
investments.

Taking the data, he divides the companies into thirteen different industry

categories and then calculates the annual percentage invested in each industry. Gompers
finds that the amount invested in high-technology industries never falls below 70 percent
of annual venture capital investments. These results illustrate that venture capital firms
greatly prefer to invest in high-technology companies, such as those in the Infonnation
Technology industry, than anything else.
After discovering the industry composition, Gompers then sets up two separate
equations to estimate the impacts of particular variables on the duration and size of
financing rounds. He uses the time in years from financing date to the next financing
date as the dependent variable for the equation evaluating the factors affecting the
duration of a venture capital financing round. Gompers uses the logarithm of the round's
funding amount as the dependent variable in the equation estimating the affects of
particular variables on the size of the financing round.
variables is used for both equations.

The same set of independent

The independent variables that are used in the

equations are a set of dummy variables accounting for the stage of the finn at the lime of
investment, the amount of capital committed to new venture funds in the previous year,
the industty ratio of tangible assets to total assets, the industry market-to-book ratio, the
industry ratio of research and development expense to sales or total assets, the age of the
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firm at the time of the venture financing round, and the logarithm of the amount of
venture financing during this round.
Gompers findings pertaining to the effects of the growth of the venture capital
industry on venture capital investment behavior are the most relevant to this paper;
therefore the focus of this analysis will rely on these results. Gompers did discover that a
relationship existed among the amount of committed capital to venture funds and their
investment behavior.

For each one standard deviation increase in commitments to

venture capital funds, Gompers finds that the time between each financing round, or its
duration, decreases by two months.

Gompers also finds that the same one standard

deviation increase in commitments to venture capital funds increases the size of the
investment by 700,000 dollars.

From the results obtained, it seems that venture

capitalists' behavior is highly affected by changes in capital inflow.
Looking back to Jensen's free cash flow theory, it seems to apply quite well to
venture capital behavior. Jensen (1986) says that if an increase in capital occurs a firm
will be more inclined to invest the money in order to earn returns. Gompers finds as the
amount of capital committed to venture funds increases so too do the size of each
investment. Gompers also finds that this increase in committed capital decreases the time
between each financing round, suggesting a potential increase in investments. If venture
capitalists were grouping investment rounds closer together, then they were most likely
able to take on more investments as their investments probably matured at a faster rate.
Therefore, a change in the inflow of capital to venture capital funds will have an impact
on venture capital behavior. This finding will be highly important for analysis regarding
venture capital behavior during the 1995-1999 stock market bubble.
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Summary of Findings and Relevance to Paper
While the three studies are quite unique, in that they are fairly unrelated, their
findings paint an interesting picture regarding both market conditions and vemure capital
behavior during the 1995-1999 stock market bubble.

In their first study, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner were able to determine key
variables that affect the supply and demand relationship for venture capital. One variable
they found that had a fairly large impact was a change in the capital gains tax rate. As
mentioned before, in 1997 the government cut the capital gains tax rate by eight
percentage points for those in the long-term bracket. Gompers and Lerner were only able
to auribute a capital gains tax cut to an increase in the demand for capital. This increase
in the demand for capital can be seen during the stock market bubble by the large
increase in entrepreneurial activity, as venture capitalists were inundated with business
plans. In conjunction with a deregulation of lhe Telecommunications industry in 1996, it
is evident that a surge in demand for capital must have occurred. In order to fund the
new business plans, venture capitalists must have also experienced a surge in the supply
of capital. While Gompers and Lerner do suggest that a decrease in the capital gains tax
rate should motivate an increase in venture capital supply, they were unable to prove this
hypothesis true.
Since many new Infonnation Technology companies came to be during the stock
market bubble, it is evident that a surge in commined capital to venture funds must have
occurred. Given the average amount of capital invested in venture funds it would have
been physically impossible for the venture capital firms to supply enough capital to
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match the increase in demand. While it was difficult to pinpoint the reasons for th.is
surge in committed capital with findings from Gompers and Lerner's study, John
Cassidy, the author of doLcon: The Greatest Story Ever Sold, is able to offer a possible
motivation regarding the surge. According to Cassidy (2000), the new capital flowing
into venture funds was "hardly speculative capital in the classic sense.,,17 Cassidy found
that many non-profit organizations, such as university endowments and charitable trusts,
had invested much of their money in venture capital firms, thinking that this type of
investment was "a less risky way to participate in the Internet boom.,,18
ff the venture capital firms of the late 1990s behaved similarly to the venture
capital finns studied by Gompers (1995), a change in investment behavior would be
expected.

Gompers found that an increase in commined capital to venture funds

increased the size of each venture capital financing round and decreased the amount of
time between these rounds. The venture capital investments in Gompers' study received
an increased amount of capital for each investment round., with those rounds closer
together it would only be expected that the firms receiving the financing would have a
significant amount of capital.

If the venture capital firms were able to bring their

investments to initial public offering quicker by having the financing rounds closer
together, then the finns may be able to take on more investments.

If this type of

behavior persisted throughout the 1995-1999 stock market bubble, then it would be
expected that many of the Information Technology companies receiving venture capital
financing received exorbitant amounts of capital in a shorter period of time.

17

18

Cassidy, Jon. DOlcon: The Greatest Story Ever Sold. pg.237
Cassidy, Jon. DOLcon: The Greatest Story Ever Sold. pg.237
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If venture capit.a.lists reacted similarly to the inflow of cornmined capital as those

studied by Gompers, than the Information Technology industry most likely experienced
market saturation as a result of an increase in the frequency and size of venture capital
investments. If these venture firms used similar discretion in the their investments as
those companies studied by Blanchard, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (1994), than the
investments made may have been in poorly modeled businesses, leading to the
bankruptcy of many companies, the plummeting of the NASDAQ index, and the bursting
of the stock market bubble in the third quarter of 1999.

In their second paper, Gompers and Lerner discovered that an increase in the
amount of commirred capital also had an impact on the pre-money valuations of venture
capital investments. As venture capital firms received an increased amount of committed
capital, the pre-money valuations for their investments increased as well.

If venture

capital firms operating during the 1995-1999 stock market behaved similarly to those in
Gompers and Lerner's study, then the suggested surge in committed capital to the venture
firms during the bubble would have raised the pre-money valuations on their investments.
A rise in the pre-money valuations of firms reaching IPO would drive up the value of the
firm and therefore, increase its offering price. Since it is already known that the stock
market surged during the 1995-1999 bubble, and that Information Technology firms
made up nearl y one-third of the nation s GDP during this time as well, it would only
I

seem logical that an increase in pre-money valuations would have occurred for these
companies. If an increase in pre-money valuations had occurred·, it would most likely
result in an over-valued Information Technology market.

Since the PIE ratios of the

S&P500 were used to define the bubble, and these ratios rose drastically from 1995 to
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1999, it can be assumed that the market value of the companies on the S&P500 rose as
well. J9 In fact, many believed that an over-valued market had caused the stock market
bubble to eventually burst.
Using data obtained from VentureOne of venture-backed investments from 1995
through 2000, this paper will test whether Gompers and Lerner's findings were relevant
to venture capital behavior during the 1995-1999 stock market bubble. This paper will
find that Gompers and Lerner's findings do provide insight into the alterations in venture
capital behavior that persisted throughout the bubble. This paper will also examine the
damaging effects of the change in venture capital behavior and its impact on creating the
unstable stock market bubble of the late 19905.

Venture Capitalists' Decision to Invest
DaJa

Many attribute market saturation as one of the main causes for the unstable
market conditions that allowed the stock market bubble to eventually burst in mid-1999.
Since venture capitaJists were responsible for providing capital to many of the
Information Technology companies that reached initiaJ public offering during the 1995
1999 stock market bubble, perhaps a change in venture capital behavior led to an increase
in investments and an eventual saturation of the Infonnation Technology marker.

In order to test the validity of this hypothesis, a relevant database had to be
composed.

Information regarding venture capital investment activity was interpreted

from a VentureOne database containing the financing infonnation for 143 venture-backed
investments that reached initial public offering from 1995 through 2000. As a proxy for
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venture capital investment behavior, the total amount of companies receiving their first
round of venture capital financing in a given quarter was used.

On average, 4.37

companies received their first round of financing per quarter. While a more accurate
measure of venture capital behavior would have been the actual number of investments
made by each venture capital firm in a given quarter, this data was not accessible.
A combination of variables used by Gompers and Lerner to evaluate the supply
and demand relationship for capita.l from venture capital firms as well as those used by
Gompers in his evaluation of influences affecting venture capital behavior, were used to
detect an alteration in behavior during the bubble.

Since it is hypothesized that the

Telecommunications Deregulation Act of 1996, in combination with an eight percent
capital gains

laX

cut in 1997 caused a surge in demand for venture capital, the effect of

these events will be measured.

A dummy variable was created for those companies

receiving their first round of financing after the 1996 deregulation act was passed. Since
some of the companies in the data sample were missing the date of their first venture
capital financing found, the data set had to be adjusted to 136 companies from 143
companies. A dummy variable was also created to account for the capital gains tax cut.
The dummy variable was equal to one for those companies receiving their first round of
financing after the eight percent tax cut.
In their first study, Gompers and Lerner also found that GDP growth had a
positive supply-side effect for venture capital, increasing the amount of capital committed
to venture funds. In order to test the impact of this hypothesis, a variable was crealed
using the level of real GDP during the quarter when each of the 136 companies received
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their first round of venture capital financing. With the first investment made in 1984, the
average rate of growth of real GDP over the period 1984 to 2000 was .81 percent.
In order to account for alterations that may have occurred to the amount of
investments taken on by venture capital firms due to changes in the monetary quantity of
each investment, two variables were created to measure the size of each investment
made. One variable was equal to the total amount of capital invested in first round
financings during the current quarter. While, the second variable was equal to the total
amount of capital invested in first round financings in the previous quarter. This variable
was created in order to account for any changes in past venture capital behavior on
current investment decisions.

On average, venture capitalists invested 46.69 million

dollars per gumer in new investments.
The data were arranged in chronological order starting with the earliest financings
and moving to the most recent investments.

Since the data are cross-sectional as

opposed to time series, little concern was expressed over any econometric problems
regarding lime series data that may have arisen.

Results
The Telecommunications Deregulation Act of 1996 opened up previously closed
doors to entrepreneurs, allowing for them to pursue new businesses, once not possible.
Such an act would theoretically increase the supply of business models to venture capital
firms, thereby increasing the demand for capital.

Only one year later these same

entrepreneurs experienced the benefits of a capital gains tax cut.

As Porerba (1989)

suggested, a lower capital gains tax will entice entrepreneurs to pursue projects, as an
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entrepreneur's income

IS

considered capital gains.

In

conjunction

with

the

Telecommunications Deregulation Act of 1996, it appears that venture capital firms
experienced an extraordinarily high demand for capital. Due to this high demand, one of
rwo things could have happened. One is that venture capitalists could have experienced a
shortage of capital, that is they were unable to meet the demands of the incoming
business models. The other option is that some other conditions were simultaneously
causing an increase in [he supply of capital to venture firms.
Using the data set memioned in the previous section, an equation was estimated to
detennine if any changes occurred to venture capital investment behavior during the
1995-1999 stock market bubble. The following equation was estimated: 20
log(numbfmdsrais4)

=PIC + f!2afterdereg + PJcapgainslax + P4gdp + Pssizefmdprev4 + P&Sizefmdrais4

Table 1:
Dependent Variable: Log(numbfrndsrais4)
Sample: 1 136
Variable

Coefficient

Constant

-2.317***

Afterdereg

0.205*"

Capgainstax

-0.853***

- GDPstart

0.0004***

0.003**
Sizefrndpre v4
0.006***
Sizefmdrais4
2
Adjusted R 0.433
F-slalistic
2\.66
If'" than t<.10 on two-tail test. If ** than .05<1<.10 on two-tail test
f ....* than t< .01 on (WO tail test

Looking at Table 1, the coefficient for those companies recei ving their first round
of financing after the deregulation in 199621 was positive and statistically significant.

See Appendix Table A-I for description of variables.
In March of 1996 three large web surf engines, EXcite. Lycos, and Yahoo!. announced plans of going
public(dol.con 98). The initial public offerings of all three were fairly large and huge stepping-stones in the
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Therefore, after the deregulation act of 1996 there was increase the number of companies
receiving their first round of venture capita! financing in a given quarter. Because the
deregulation act of 1996 most likely caused a surge in demand, some other market
condition must have simultaneously been causing an increase in the supply of capital to
venture funds in order to increase the amount of first-round investments. Had the market
experienced a shortage after the increase in demand brought on by the deregulation, then
the amount of funds would not have increased. In fact, for those firms who received their
first financing rounds after the deregulation there was a .2 percent increase in the number
of funds raised in a quarter.
Similar, but stronger results hold true for the those firms receiving their first
round of financing after the 1997 capital gains tax cut.

A negative and statistically

significant relationship existed between those experiencing the effects of the capital gains
tax rate and the number of first-round investments in a given quarter. Therefore, after the
capital gains tax rate cut, venture capitalists increased the amount of first round
investments they made by .853 percent. Clearly the capital gains tax cut must have also
had a supply-side effect on capital tlowing into venture firms. This fairly large increase
in the decision of venrure capital finns to finance companies in a particular quarter,
clearly illustrates a change in venture capital investment behavior, most likely caused by
a change in its supply and demand for capital. Such a large increase may have aJso lead
to the over saturated market place that persisted throughout the stock market bubble of
the late 1990s. This large increase in the supply of capital to venture firms may have
resulted in the implementation of Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory, resulting in an
building of the Internet. It is unclear as to whether the dummy variable for the 1996 Telecommunications
Deregulation Act is actually picking up what some consider to be the building blocks of the stock market
bubble.
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increased amount of investments and a potential alteration of venture capital investment
behavior.

In their first paper, Gompers and Lerner had found that changes in level of the
real GDP had affects on the supply of capital to venture firms. Gompers and Lerner found
that an increase in the level of real GOP increased the amount of capital investors were
willing to commit, resulting in an increased inflow of capital. However, upon further
testing, Gompers and Lerner discovered that the real rate of GDP did not prove
significant for influencing a venture capitalist's decision to invest in a particular business.
While the level of real GOP did prove statistically significant in this study, its
impact on the increase in the number of first round financings in the same quarter was a
mere .0004 percent. 22 Therefore, it appears that the level of real GDP had little influence
on suppliers of capital to venture firms or on the venture capitalists decision to finance a
new business.
The equation also looks to the amount of money invested both in the current and
previous quarters in order to discover if any relationship existed between the size of the
investments and their amount. If both the amount of the investments and the size of the
investments increased, it appears that a change in venture capital investment behavior did
in fact occur.

For if the venture capitalists are simultaneously increasing the amount of

money they are giving to new companies. and increasing the amount of companies they
are giving the money to, there is little chance that they could be spreading the same
amount of money over more firms. Therefore. they must be receiving an increase in the
2:2 A separate equation was estimated using the level of corporate profits as an economic measure. It would
seem that corporate profits would have provided a more accurate account of economic wealth, however, its
inclusion changed the signs and significance levels of other variables. Therefore. it appeared that the level
of the real GDP provided the best overall fit, and was used instead of corporate profits. The regressions
results for the equation using corporate profits can be viewed in Table A-3 of the Appendix.
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supply of capital and are then using this capital

10

finance more and more companies with

higher and higher financing rounds.
This hypothesis proved to be the case. Both the amount of capital invested in new
companies in the previous quarter as well as the amount of capilal invested in the current
quarter were statistically significant and positive. However, the impact of the size of the
investments on the amount of companies receiving money was fairly smaJI in magnitude,
.003 percent increase for the previous quarter's financing and .006 percent increase for
the current quarter's financing.

Not only do the results illustrate a positive correlation

among venture capital investments, but they also illustrate that the current amount of
money being invested has a slightly larger impact on the amount of companies receiving
capital. Because both figures are positive, an increase in the amount of money invested
in the first financing round must also increase the amount of firms receiving capital.
Therefore, as more capital came into the venture capital funds, venture capilalisLS
allocated more capital for investment, and then invested in a greater amount of
companies.

This increase in the amount of companies being financed could have

potentially led to the market saturation that characterized many industries in mid-1999.

Conclusion
Clearly, Gompers and Lerner's (1998) theory regarding the supply and demand of
capital to and from venture capital funds as well as its affect on venture capital
investment behavior works well to explain the market conditions that existed during the
1995-1999 stock market bubble.

A dramatic increase in entrepreneurial demand for

capital, brought on by the deregulation of the Teleconununications industry in 1996 and a
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huge capital gains tax break in 1997, caused a shock to the equilibrium of venture capital
supply and demand.
An equally large increase in capital inflow must have occurred, as venture capital
investment behavior increased after the 1996 deregulation and even more dramatically
afler the 1997 capital gains tax cut. With a large and most likely steady flow of capital to
venture funds, it appears that Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory came into affect, as
venture capitalists increased the amount of their investments. If the venture capital fiIlT\s
investing during the stock market bubble behaved similarly to those firms studied by
Blanchard, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (1994), than it would be expected that the
firms used little discretion when choosing the business models to invest in.

In fact.

according to one Harvard Business School graduate quoted in Cassidy's dot.con: The
Grealest Story Ever Sold, "You would walk into offices in New York and people would
immediately offer money to you if they !.hought you looked smart. We didn't have any
data on the market; we didn't have a product demo; we didn't have anything. We had a
business plan, but that was it.,,23

How Venture Capitalists Valued Their Investments
Data
As the NASDAQ reached unprecedented levels during the late 1990s, many
believed that the United States now had a "New Economy" on its hands. An economy
that's behavior was nothing like anyone had ever seen. In fact, this whole idea of a "New
Economy" led many, especially venture capitalistS and investment bankers, to abandon
the proven ways of the past for the experimental ways of the future. Instead of valuing
11
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companies by the numbers on their balance sheets or the money in the bank. venture
capitalists and investment bankers now looked to the amount of visitors to a web page or
the potential benefit the company could bring to its users. While the value of a company
is most definitely measurable by the benefit it brings to a consumer, the company is only
sustainable for so long without profits or even revenue for that matter.

If venture capitalists were using new methods to value companies, than the
proven ways of the past would have had little influence on companies valued during the
1995-1999 stock market bubble. To determine what, if any. new valuation method was
used during the bubble, a new regression equation was estimated using the same
VentureOne sample of 143 venture-backed companies reaching !PO between 1995 and
2000.

Due to missing data for certain companies, the sample was adjusted to 124

companies.
Since most companies in the sample reached IPO between 1995 and rnid-1999,
the defined boundaries of the bubble, it appeared most relevant to use the pre-money
valuations given to companies just prior to their IPO. As mentioned before, a pre-money
valuation is the product of the company's offer price and its amount of outstanding
shares. Therefore, the equation will look at what factors affect a company's price or
worth. For those companies included in the regression it was found that on average, the
companies were valued at 607.71 million dollars.
It has already been discovered that a change in investment behavior did occur
during the bubble, and that this change most likely resulted from an inflow of capital to
venture funds.

Gompers (1995) finds that increases in capital commitments to venture

funds will both decrease the duration of the fund's financing rounds as well as increase
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the amount of money given at each stage. Therefore, venture capitalists will alter their
investment behavior, increasing the total amount of money invested in each company and
decreasing the amount of time between each financing round. This results in companies
with increased amounts of capital reaching JPO faster.

In order to see if any of these

alterations in venture capital behavior occurred during the bubble, as well as the
magnitude of their impact on company valuations, three variables were generated to
account for these alterations.
First, if venture capitalists did increase the monetary size of their financing rounds
then it would be expected thal there would be an increased total amount of capital
invested in the company prior to its JPO. Therefore, a variable equal to the total amount
of money invested in each company prior to its JPO was generated using the financing
information provided by the VentureOne database. On average each company received
68.44 million dollars prior to its lPO. When looking to the average company valuation,
the figure is ten times larger than the invested capital, so clearly variables aside from
invested capital must have reflected a company's valuation.
Gompers also found that venture capitalists decreased the amount of time between
each financing round. In order to account for this potential change in behavior a new
variable had to be generated. Using the financing information for each company, the
amount of months between each financing round was calculated.

An arithmetical

average was then taken to account for any unknown circumstances that may have
influenced one financing round and none of the others. On average, venture capitalists
waited 12.09 months, or about a year, between rounds for the 124 companies included in
the sample.
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It would seem logical, that if venture capitalists were decreasing the amount of
time between each round that their companies would reach IPO sooner than under normal
investment behavior circumstances.

To account for this variation the total amount of

months in between a company's first financing round and its date of lPO were calculated
for each of the 124 companies in the sample. On average, it took the companies 39
months, or a little over three years to reach lPO.
Because a company's pre-money valuation is supposed to reflect its worth, it
would seem that certain characteristics such as reputation and profitability would provide
accurate information as to a company's value. Since information regarding a company's
reputation was not accessible, the size of a company was used as a proxy. The larger a
company, the more established it would appear. A company's size was then measured by
the amount of its employees. For the 124 companies in the sample, on average they each
employed 271.96 individuals. This is larger than the six member start-up companies that
became all too prevalent during the bubble.
The database obtained from VentureOne provided infonnation as to the
company's status at the time of IPO.

From this information a dummy variable was

created. The variable was equal to one for those companies that were generating profits
at the time of IPO. In a sample of 124 companies, only 20 companies were profitable, or
16 percent of the sample. It would seem logical that a company's profitability would
have a fairly large impact on its pre-money valuations. For if a company could cover its
costs, it would be expected that it would be worth a lot more money than its less capable
competition.
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The potential growth of a market is aJso reflected in a company's pre-money
vaJuatlon. If a market was expected to have high growth, it would only seem logical that
its pre-money valuation would reflect this increased growth opportunity. However, if a
market was highly competitive and barriers to entry high it would be expected that a
company's success rate would not be as high. For these companies it would be expected.
that a lower pre-money valuation would be appropriate.

Several variables were

constructed to account for these variations.
In 1996 the government passed the Telecommunications Deregulation Act,
forcing previously protected companies to become competitive overnight. This opened
the gate to many entrepreneurs looking CO enter the market.

With market dynamics

aJtered, it would seem that companies looking to enter the Telecommunications industry
after the deregulation would fare much bener than those looking to enter before the act
was passed. To account for this change, a dummy variable was created. The dummy
variable is equal to one for those companies going public after the 1996 deregulation act.
While the market conditions in the Telecommunications industry are accounted
for, there are several other industries comprising the Information Technology sector. To
account for variations in pre-money valuations that may occur due to growth potentials of
particular markets, a set of dummy variables were created.

Using the industry

classifications glven to each company by the VentureOne database the set included nine
variables.
Product,

It controlled for the Broadcasting, Cable Service Provider, Connectivity
FiberopticlPhoconic.

Internet

Service

Provider,

TeleNideoconferencing,

Telecommunications Service Provider, Wireless Equipment, and Wireless Service
Provider industries.
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While market differentiations have been accounted for, potential market growth
has not. It is fairly difficult to estimate market growth levels, especially with such shocks
as the 1995-1999 stock market bubble. Gompers and Lerner (2000) used the amount of
patents granted as a proxy for industry innovation. If an industry increases its innovation
an increase its market potential would be expected and a subsequent increase in pre
money valuations should follow.

While Gompers and Lerner looked at the

Biotechnology industry, which relies very heavily on patent protection, this paper applied
the same logic to the Infonnation Technology industry, hoping that the amount of patents
granted would provide similar information. Therefore, a variable equal to the amount of
patents granted at the time of a company's IPO was constructed. Between 1995 and 2000
an average of 155,666.44 patents were granted.
Using the above-mentioned variables, a regression equation was constructed to
estimate the impact of market conditions and venture capital behavior on a company's
pre-money valuation.

Results
Given the market conditions existing during the stock market bubble, it was of
little surprise that the bubble would in fact burst, as many companies were valued at
extremely high levels. Using a hedonic price regression, this paper attempts to discover
the reasons for these high valuations.

A hedonic price regression Jooks to company

characteristics and market conditions to explain the variation in a product's price.
Therefore, the following hedonic price regression was constructed to explain the
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variations m Infonnation Technology companies' pre-money valuations from 1995 to
2000;2.1
log(premonval)

=~lconstant + ~log(avgtimc) + ~Iog(timeipo) + ~4afterdereg + ~scosi7-e. + ~6profitable

The logarithm of the pre-money valuations was used as the dependent variable. The
independent variables used, accounted for company characteristics and changes in
venture capital investment behavior. It was of very little surprise that the results seem to
support Gompers' (1995) findings regarding Jensen's (1986) application of free cash
flow theory.
Table 2:
Dependent Variable: Log(premonval)
Sample: 1 124
Variable
Constant

Coefficient
0.308

Log(avgtime)

-0.451 **

Log(timeipo)
Afterdereg
Cosize
Profitable
Broadcastj ngdum
Cspdummy
Connproddum
Fiberopdum
Ispdummy
Televconfdum
Tspdummy
Wireequipdum
Wspdummy
Monbefipo
PatenlSgranted

0.395**
0.889***
0.0004++
0.560**
0.908**
1.322***
1.333***
2.358***
1.691***
U34**
1.809***
1.501***
1.968***
0.002*
.00002***

Adjusted R 2 0.594
F-statislic

12.24

If * than t<.1 0 on two-tail test, If ** than .05<t<.10 on two-tail test, If *** than 1<.0 I on two-Illiitest
If ...... than t<. to on one-tail test, ]f ..... than .05<1<.10 on one-tail lest, If + than t<.01 on one-tail lest
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See Appendix Table A-I for explanation of variable terms.
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Looking at the financing rounds of 124 companies, the logarithm of each
company's average amount of time between financing rounds was regressed against the
logarithm of its pre-money valuation.
relationship existed.

It was found that a negative and significant

Therefore, as the time between each round increased by one

percent. the pre-money valuation of the company prior to its IPO would be .45 percent
lower. This is inconsistent with findings regarding normal venture capital investment
behavior. Since venture capitalists invest in companies they believe will prove highly
profitable, it makes most sense that the increased time between rounds allows for the
venture capitaJists to perform the proper due diligence, thereby making sure their capital
is being used wisely and productively. By decreasing the time between rounds venture
capitalists would not have the ample time to perform this due diligence, and therefore,
would not be monitoring the behavior of companies as closely.

It would only seem

logical that this lack of supervision would lead to a lower pre-money valuation at the time
of lPO. However, it appears that during the late 1990s the lack of time between rounds,
and the potential lack of supervision and due diligence. lead to a higher pre-money
valuation.
It was more difficult, however, to decipher whether this change in venture capital
investment behavior also affected the valuations of companies that were rushed

to

IPO.

In order to anempt to measure this effect, the logarithm of the variable representing the

amount of months it lOok a company to reach !PO was regressed against the logarithm of
the company's pre-money valuation at IPO.

Using Gompers' (1995) findings and

Jensen's (1986) theory it would appear that since a decreased time between financing
rounds led to a higher pre-money valuation, that fewer months from the first round of
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financing to IPO would lead to a higher pre-money valuation as well. This hypothesis
did not prove true; instead findings regarding normal venture capital investment behavior
remained consistent. For every one percent increase in the amount of months it took each
company to reach IPO after its first venture capital financing round, there was a .39
percent increase in the pre-money valuation of the company. It makes logical sense that
the longer a company spends financing and establishing itself, the greater its value should
be prior to IPO. And while this does not illustrate any major change in venture capital
investment behavior, the small magnitude of its impact does illustrate that the amount of
time spent financing and build.ing products prior to the IPO was not as important in
calculating pre-money valuations as other factors analyzed.
Proposing that the deregulation of the Telecommunications industry in 1996 was
a catalyst for increased entrepreneurial behavior, it would appear that those companies
who reached !PO after the deregulation would have a pre-money valuation based on the
new market dynamics. Using a dummy variable equal to one for those companies who
reached !PO after the 1996 Telecommunications Deregulation Act, it was found that
these companies had a higher pre-money valuation by .889 percent. 25

With fewer

constraints on the market, it would appear that growth and profitability opportunities
would be much greater for those companies reaching !PO after 1996 than those that went
public prior to the deregulation.
Generally the pre-money valuation of a company should reflect the company's
WOI1h, based predominantly on its finances, size, and profitability. Using variables for

In March of t996 three large web surf engines, Excite, Lycos, and Yahoo!, announced plans of going
public(dol.con: The Greatest Story Ever Sold 98). The IPOs of aU three were fairly large and became huge
stepping-stones in the building of the Imemet. It is unclear as to whether the dummy variable for the L996
Telecommunications Deregulation Act is actually picking up the effec15 of these IPOs.
25
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each of these characteristics in the model. it would appear that these variables would have
a fairly large impact on the pre-money valuations. However, it was found that those
variables standard for calculating pre-money valuations had a statistically significant but
small impact on the valuations of the 124 companies sampled.

Using the amount of

employees as a proxy for the size of the company, an increase in the company's staff by
one employee increased its pre-money valuation by .00037 percent.

It appears that

company size was not as important for pre-money valuations in the late 1990s as was the
amount of venture capital invested in the company prior to its IPO. For each additional
one million dollars invested, the pre-money vaJuation increased by .0023 percent. Since
many companies were not generating enough revenues during financing rounds to cover
their costs, they relied heavily on venture capital financings. Using these financings as a
proxy for company revenues, the results show that a company's monetary value had a
small impact on its pre-money valuation prior to IPO. These findings illustrate strong
implications that venture capitalists were using some other type of valuation model to
obtain the pre-money values of their companies.
Of any of the standard variables tested, it would only seem logical that those
companies who were profitable at the time of IPO would receive a higher pre-money
valuation than those that were not. And while these results held true, the increase in the
pre-money valuation was a minimal .56 percent, this finding. only further confirms that
the monetary and financial positions of those companies reaching IPO from 1995 through
2000 had little significance on their pre-money valuations.
Seeing as market dynamics look to have had an impact on a company's pre
money valuation prior to its IPO, a series of dummy variables were created to measure
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the impact of a company's industry on its pre-money valuation.

The companies in the

data set were divided into ten industry segments. Excluding those that fell under the
"Communication and Networking: Other" category, the other nine were regressed against
the logarithm of the pre-money valuation. The estimated equation found that all nine
were positive. significant, and had fairly large impacts on the pre-money valuations. Not
surprisingly, those in the Fiberoptics industry had the largest impact with a pre-money
valuation 2.36 percent higher than those in the excluded category. Those companies that
were either Internet Service Providers, Telecommunication Service Providers, or
Wireless Service Providers also had higher pre-money valuations by 1.69 percent, 1.81
percent, and 1.97 percent, respectively. These findings illustrate that the potential growth
for particular industries must have been a fairly significant factor in determining the pre
money valuations for companies in the sample. Since all these industries were fairly
new, and relied heavily on the use of the Internet and other technologically advanced
devices, some of which had yet to be developed, the projected industry growths were
highly speculative.
The last variable included in the equation was one represenring the amount of
patents granted in the quarter in which the company went to LPO. Gompers and Lerner
(2000) had used the amount of patents granted in their hedonic price regression for the
pre-money valuations of Biotechnology finns.

They felt that the amount of patents

granted acted as a proxy for industry innovation. Using this same logic the amount of
patents granted was included in this equation. And while the variable proved statistically
significant its positive impact was the smallest of all the variables included in the
regression, for each additional patent granted increased the pre-money valuation by
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.00002 percenl. It appears that the level of innovation did not prove to have as much of
an impact on the pre-money valuations of Information Technology companies as it did
Biotechnology companies. Either companies in the Information Technology industry did
not require patents for their products, or perhaps, they were not far enough along in their
product development to even apply for a patent.

The latter seems to be a feasible

explanation, looking at the changes that appear to have occurred to both venture capital
investment behavior and the formulas used to calculate pre-money valuations.

Conclusioll

From the regression results it is apparent that a change in venture capital valuation
methods occurred. Those variables that tended to have heavy weights on pre-money
valuations in the past proved to take a back seat to new variables measuring market
potential. While the growth of a market is important for valuing companies, it is only a
concrete measurement for established industries. With new industries that are rapidly
expanding, such as the Infonnation Technology industry, market growth values tend to be
highly speculative. If venture capitalists had been relying heavily on these speculative
growth levels, as it appears they were, then they would have valued their companies with
this information. This may help explain why the market was valued so highly, as seen by
the large increase in the S&P500 PIE ratios 26 from 1995 to 1999.
Since only 16 percent of the companies in the sample were generating profits at
the time of IPO, it would appear that many of these companies would not be able to
suppon their valuations. In fact, when the bubble burst in 1999 many of (he Infonnation
Technology companies suffered.
26

This would explain why after 1999' Information

See Appendix Graph A-t.
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Technology no longer composed nearly one-third of the nation's GDP. However, the
venture capitalists were not the only ones responsible for increasing company valuations.
The next section of this paper will evaluate price jumps in a company's stock after its
IPO.

Venture Capital Influences on Price Changes After Initial Public Offerings
Data
One of the biggest stories during the late 19905 was the IPO of each dOLcom.
With prices sometimes jumping over 100 percent of the opening price on the first day, the
IPOs turned entrepreneurs, investment bankers and venture capitalists into paper multi
millionaires overnight. 27 The market had never seen anything quite like it before. With
stock market investors driving up the price of each company's stock, it would appear that
the market believed the company had been undervalued. While some of these dramatic
increases in price had been corrected after a few months of trading, others went on to
maintain these high valuations only to have them deflated with the bursting bubble.
Many investors jumped on the bandwagon, filling their portfolios with technology and
Internet stocks, while skeptics attempted to figure out how companies, years from
generating profits, could obtain and then maintain such high valuations.
The Infonnation Technology sector did not remain unscathed. Its IPOs actually
brought about huge jumps in valuations for companies who had not even finished
development of their product. This paper has already illustrated a change in venture
capital investment behavior, which led to an increase in venture capital investments.
Using Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory, the steady stream of inflowing capital most
27
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likely led to venture capitalists lack of discretion when making investments. It was also
found that a decrease in the time between investments led to a lack of time for venture
capitalists to perform the proper due diligence on companies. This decrease in time led to
an increase in the companies' pre-money valuations prior to their IPO.

Therefore, it

appears that these companies the market chose to value so highly, were chosen with little
discretion, then not followed closely by' their venture capitaJ investors, and brought to
lPO with a value that most likely did not reflect its monetary or financial status.
While it is clear that venture capitalists did alter their behavior to saturate the
Information Technology market with over-valued companies, it is unclear as to whether
they were responsible for the large increases in stock prices that pursued after nearly
every IPO.

To account for these large jumps in prices a variable was generated for

changes occurring after one day of trading, one week of traeling. and one month of
traeling. The offer price of each of the 143 companies was available in the VentureOne
database. However, the prices after one day of trading, one week of trading. and one
month of trading had to be obtained using an online historical quote database compiled
by BigCharts.

Since many companies had merged or been bought up by larger

companies the sample size was adjusted to 124 companies. To calculate the change in
price after one day of trading, the logarilhm of the company's offer price was subtracted
from lhe logarithm of its stock price after one day of trading. The same formula was used
to calculate the change in price after one week of traeling and after one month of traeling
by substituting the logarithm of the stock prices after one week of trading and after one
month of trading for the -logarithm of the stock price after one day of trading. These
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variables were then used as the dependent variables for three separate regression
equations.
Since the company's industry proved to have a fairly large affect on its pre-money
valuation prior to IPO, it seemed logical to account for this variation in trying to explain
the large jumps in prices. Calculating the monetary size of the industry by totaling the
amount of venture capital invested in the industry up to but not including the quarter in
which the company went to lPO. it was hypothesized that a highly financed industry was
more likely to experience a larger jump in price than a less financed industry. Perhaps
the venture capitalists' anenlion to particular industries, expressed by their high level of
investment in companies within these industries, illustrated to less-informed investors
that these industries had a high potential for growth and were, therefore, favorable
industries to invest in. Such a signal would cause a fairly strong increase in investments
in these industries, driving up the stock prices of companies within these industries and
eventually leading

10

an overvalued market.

Not only were venture capitalists using investors to fuel the growth of their
financed companies. but they also relied on ideal market dynamics to create the large
increases in prices. With some company stock prices as much as doubling themselves
after one day of trading, it is apparent that companies experienced. extremely high initial
returns. Riner (1998) refer to this type of IPO market, in which there are "periods of high
average initial returns and rising volume" of companies reaching initial public offering,
as a "hot issue" market.

28

While it is difficult to explain why these markets develop,

Ritter offers three explanations.

28

One such explanation is a change in the "risk

Ritter, Jay. "Initial Public Offerings." pg. 9.
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composition" of companies.

29

Riner suggests that as a higher volume of riskier

companies reach IPO, as was the case with the Infonnation Technology companies
during the late 1990s, there will be an increase in initial average returns, because riskier
companies tend to be undervalued or under priced.
Ritter attributes another possible explanation to a change in capital commitments
from mutual funds. 3D If a mutual fund increases its demand for IPOS, it will supply the
venture capital companies with the capital necessary to bring a company public, thereby
increasing the amount of companies reaching IPO as well as driving up their valuations.
Since it has already been seen that an inflow of capital must have occurred in order to
supply the demand for capital, the notion of an increase in capital commitments from
mutual funds may have played a fairly large role in creating a '.'hot issue" market during
the late 19905. Ritter suggests that if venture capital funds are aware of this increase in
mutual funds managers' demand for IPOs, the venture capitalists "might attempt to take
advantage of a period of high valuations by timing their issues for these periods.'.J]
Therefore, as mutual fund managers invest more and more capital in IPOs, driving up the
valuations of each company, a venture capitalist will look to take a company public in
such a market in which the company would receive high initial returns.

The

unprecedented increases in stock market prices of IPOs after one day of trading suggest
(hat behavior, similar to that hypothesized by Ritter, must have been prevalent during the
late 1990s.

29
:lO
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Ritter's third explanation is the belief that investors "assume that there is

a

positive autocorrelation in the initial returns on IPOS.,,32 Therefore, "these investors are
willing to bid up the price of an issue once it starts trading if other recent issues have
risen in price,',)3 Ritter believes that "if enough investors follow such a strategy, they
may induce the positive autocorrelation of initial returns that they assumed.,,34 So if the
NASDAQ, the stock exchange on which nearly all of the Information Technology
companies were traded,35 was experiencing a positive and steady increase in its value,
investors would be more likely to invest in companies on the exchange, driving up each
company's stock market price. During the late 1990s, the NASDAQ and several other
stock exchanges grew at unprecedented levels, as more and more of the American public
invested their money in dOl-com stocks and Information Technology companies. In order
to account for Ritter's hypothesis regarding autocorrelation among initial returns on IPOs
a variable was generated using NASDAQ performance. This variable was created by
taking the percent change in the NASDAQ at the time of the company's IPO from its
level two quarters prior. If Ritter's hypothesis holds true than a large and positive percent
change should be responsible for driving up the price of the stock. By looking at its
effects after one day, one week, and one month of trading, the regressions will show
whether the percent change in the NASDAQ performance was responsible for a longterm or short-term increases in the stock's price.
While Ritter does hypothesize three possible explanations for the existence of
"hot issue" markets and their inevitable exploitation, he also acknowledges that some
32 Ritter. Jay. "Inilial Public Offerings." pg. 10
» Riner, Jay. "Inilial Public Offerings." pg. 10
34 Riner. Jay. "Inilial Public Offerings." pg. 10
3..5 Perkins. Anthony B. and Michael C. Perkins. The Internet Bubble: The inside story on why il burst
and whal you can do 10 orofit now. pg.71.
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questions remain unanswered by his hypothesis. Each of the three explanations provides
an answer to one of the market conditions existing during "hot issue" markets, but all
three fail to explain why the companies wouLd be so under priced entering the market.
Looking to discover a variable to account for this phenomenon, it was hypothesized lhat
the answer may lie in the pre-money valuations of each company. Looking back to the
pre-money valuation equation used earlier in this paper, it was believed that the
unexplained variations in the equation held the answer.

In order to import the

unexplained variations into the current equation, the companies for each data set had to
match up perfectly. It was hypothesized that any variables unaccounted for in evaluating
a company's pre-money valuation, may have had an impact on causing a change in price
one day, one week, and one month after trading.
Using the variables mentioned above, an equation was derived to discover the
impact of venture capital behavior on driving up stock prices after their investments had
gone public.

Results
Using the percent change in price after one day, one week, and one month of
trading for the adjusted sample size of 124 companies, an equation was estimated in an
attempt to find an explanation for the large jumps in price that led to the subsequent
market over valuations of Infonnation Technology companies. The following equations
were derived: 36
(1) dlprchgday = P.constant + ~Iog(industrysizejpo) + ~3nasdaqchange2 + P4premonvatresid.2

(2) dlprchgweek = Plconstant + ~tog(industrysizeipo) + P3nasdaqchange2 + P4premonvalresid2

]6

See Table A-I of the Appendix for variable definitions.
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(3) dlprchgmonth = PICOnstant + ~Iog(indu.strysizeipo) + I33nasdaqchange2 + p~premonvalresid2

Since it was hypothesized that a highly financed industry would have a greater
impact on dri ving up the price of a stock than a lesser financed industry, the logarithm of
the size of a company's industry at the time of its IPO was regressed against the variables
accounting for the change in price after one day, one week, and one month of trading.
Table 3:
iSample: 1 124
dlprchgweek
dlprchgmonth
dlprchgdav
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
-1.216***
-1.420***
-0.959*"*
0.184***
0.140**
0.217***
0.770***
0.808***
1.011***
0.145***
0.082***
0.087**
Adjusted R2 0.174 Adjusted R2 0.182 Adjusted R2 0.196
iF-Statistic
8.45 IF-Statistic 10.13
IF-Statistic
10.97
~f * 1<.10 on a two-tail test, If ** .05<t<.10 on a (wo-taillest, If *** t<.OI on a two-tail test

!Dependent Variable:
Variable
Constant
Log( indsturysizeipo)
NASDAQchange2
Preruonvalresid2

The hypothesis held true for all three regreSSions. In fact, the magnitude of its effect
actually grew as the time from !PO to the last day of measured trading increased.
Therefore, as the logarithm of the size of the industry increased, there was a .14 percent
change in the price after one day, a slightly greater .19 increase after one week of trading,
and an even greater .22 percent increase after one month of trading. It appears that the
more established, financially, the industry the more likely the price of the stock was
going to increase and remain increasing for a given amount of time. These constant
Increases would help to explain the bubble atmosphere that persisted through the late
1990s.
Using a variable equal to the percent change of the level of the NASDAQ two
quarters prior

to

a company's IPO, the regression tested the impact of the NASDAQ's

behavior on the company's increase in stock price one day, one week, and one month
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after trading. Consistent with Ritter's hypothesis, the behavior of the NASDAQ did, in
facl, have a positive and statistically significant impact on a company's change in price.
This impact grew as the time from IPO grew, suggesting even further, that a positive
autocorrelation did exist among slock market returns. The magnitude of the impact of the
percent change in the NASDAQ level was far greater than the monetary size of the
industry. Therefore. it appears that particular market conditions were more responsible
for the overvaJuations of Information Technology companies.

In fact, a one percent

increase in the level of the NASDAQ two quarters prior to a company's IPO increased
the company's change in price after one day of trading by .78 percent. The number rose
to a .81 percent increase in the company's change in price after one week of trading and
to a 1.01 increase in the company's change in price after one month of trading. These
figures are close to four to five times higher than the impact from the monetary size of
the industry, however, they do not fully account for changes in the company's stock
market price.
Also included in the equation was the variable representing the unaccounted for
variations in the pre-money valuation equation used earlier in this paper. This variable
was used in an attempt to find out why companies would be so undervalued entering a
"hot issues" market. The regression results show a positive and statistically significant
relationship between the unexplained variations and the price jumps. The magnitude of
this relationship diminishes as the time from initial public offering increases. Therefore,
it appears that the unexplained variations work to illustrate the initial jump in prices but
the effects taper off as the company's time trading on the NASDAQ increases.
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Looking at the adjusted R 2 ,s for all three equations, it is noticeable that they
increase as the time from IPO increases. An increased adjusted R 2 illustrates Lhat Lhe
independent variables explain more of the variations in the stock prices. Therefore, it
appears that other factors unaccounted for may cause the initial price jumps on the first
day of trading, but these effects appear to subside as the company becomes established on
the NASDAQ. These unaccounted for factors may be tied to the psychologically driven
behavior of investors or a large variety of other variables.

Conclusion
It has already been established that venrure capitalists relied heavily on a
company's industry when calculating its pre-money valuation.

It is also known that

many of these industries were fairly new and their growLh prospects highly speculative.
Therefore, the pre-money valuations many companies went to IPO with reflected very
little concrete evidence as to the worth of the company. It was then found that the more
venture capital invested in a panicular industry, the greater the jump in the companies'
stock prices after their IPOs. Clearly, these companies were now valued at outrageously
high levels, and dangerous levels at that. When looking at the S&P500 PIE ratios,3? it is
evident that the market was highly over-valued. Therefore, it appears that the venture
capitalists attention

to

particular industries and their potential growth prospects worked

effectively in raising the valuations of their investments and subsequently inflating Lhe
stock market bubble.
While venture capitalists aided in the inflation of the bubble and provided
investors with companies to invest in, they did not work alone in building the bubble. As
n See Appendix Graph A-I.
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seen by the regression results, individuals making investments based on the theory of
autocorrelation among stock market returns, drove up an already rising NASDAQ index
that much further. The effects of this investment behavior on the price jumps after !PO
were much greater than those caused by the monetary size of a company's industry.
Therefore, it appears that investors were much more responsible for the market over
valuation that occurred after !PO. It is not apparent, however, whether investors made
these investment decisions on their own accord or used signals from venture capitalists
and analyst reports from investment bankers to help guide their decisions.
Looking at the regression results for the unexplained variations in the pre-money
valuations, they can be interpreted several ways. These unexplained variations might
work to answer Ritter's question on why those companies reaching lPO during a "hot
issue" market are generally under priced.
While it is unknown what the unexplained variations in the pre-money valuation
equation represent, it may be hypothesized that they represent the new valuation fonnulas
so many venture capital firms used to value the new Information Technology companies.
Jon Cassidy (2002) speaks of one such incidence in his book doLcon: The Greatest Story
Ever Sold, he mentions one company, Netcom, that "didn't make any profits or pay any
dividends," therefore, "its stock was priced

On

the basis of a new fonnula: value per

subscriber.,,38 If the companies in the sample had been valued using a consumer-value
method, that is valuing the company not with the revenues or profits it would generate
but by the product's usefulness to its consumers, than none of the variables included in
the equation would have explained these results. Since only those variables used in the
standard valuation formula were included in the regression. the impact of those variables
38
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used in the new valuation formulas would have been placed among the unexplained
variations in the equation. If the new valuation formula was responsible for the large
jumps in prices, especially after the first day of trad.ing, than it may suggest that these
valuation models were not accurate. If the venture capitalists had used the pre-money
valuations obtained from the new formulas to approximate an appropriate worth of the
company, then there would be no reason for this large jump in price on the first day.
However, the results do show that the effect tapers itself illustrating that the market must
settle the company back to its appropriate value after about a week. The week is used as
an approximation since the magnitude of change caused by the unexplained variations are
practically equivalent one week and one month after tracting, .082 percent and .087
percent respectively.
Since the information used to calculate the pre-money valuations using the new
valuation method is unknown, it is quite d.ifficult to hypothesize what factors involved in
that valuation may cause the large price jumps on the first day of trading. One hypothesis
may be the inclusion of certain variables that would cause investors to interpret that the
company had been under valued.

Since the investors were the individuals willing to

purchase the company at such a high stock price, they must have believed that the
company was really worth the amount of money they paid for it. Therefore, as more
information was released regarding the actual worth of the company, the effect of these
variables would d.iminish in driving up the price of the stock and it would settle at its true
market value.
Another hypothesis regards the use of risk in valuing a particular investment. In
fact, most venture capitalists do use risk as a measure to value companies, for the riskier
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the investment the greater the gamble and therefore the returns to investors to compensate
for this large gamble would also be great. Ritter (1998) proposes that a variation in the
risk of the companies reaching IPO may be responsible for causing a "hot issue" market.
Since there was no information to account for any risk measure, due to the lack of
available venture capital investment data, no such variable was included in the equation.
So jf risk did playa role in the venture capitalist's pre-money valuation of a company, the
results would be reflected in the unexplained variations for the equation. Had risk been
the variable reflected by the unexplained variations, than the greater the risk the greater
the jump in price on the first day.

If the venture capitalists had failed to include a

measure of risk in their pre-money valuations or had used a level of risk that was lower
than investors had anticipated, it would appear that the companies were under valued.
Investors, in order to take advantage of an under priced investment, placed their money in
the companies, raising the price and value of the company after only one day of trading.
However, as more information regardlng the company's risk became available, most
likely one week to one month after its IPO, the risk affect slowly wore off and the market
gradually returned the company to its proper valuation.
While it is unclear as to what the unexplained variations

In

the pre-money

valuation equation represent, It is clear that they appear to explain some type of
asymmetric information, in that the venture capitalists knew more about the worth of the
company than did the investors.

It is not known whether venture capitalists sent

messages to the public through their actions that companies were under valued or if
bubble psychology had driven the investors to believe this under valuation on their own
accord.

Either way, it is clear that some unaccounted variation in the pre-money
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valuations of the companies reaching IPO from 1995 lhrough 2000 had an effect on
increasing the company's stock market price initially.

Conclusion
Using Gompers and Lerner's (1998) analysis of supply and demand relationships
that affect venture capital finns, it became apparent that a simultaneous surge in capital
inflow and entrepreneurial behavior triggered the subsequent venture capital investment
behavior that persisted throughout the late 19905. Through careful analysis of investment
behavior, industry financing. and economic and market conditions this paper was able to
determine that such a change in behavior did occur.
A deregulated industry and a strong capital gains tax cut led entrepreneurs to
pursue new projects, previously unavailable. This surge in entrepreneurial behavior. or
increase in the demand for capital, left venture capitalists inundated with hundreds of new
business plans.

And while the estimated equations were unable to locate the equally

large surge in capital inflow that must have pursued, Jon Cassidy (2002) pinpointed a
potential cause.

Apparently non-profit investors, such as universities and charitable

trusts, dumped their money into venture capital funds, seeing the investment as a less
risky way to take advantage of the surge in the Information Technology sectOr.

39

This

unprecedented amount of capital flowing into venture funds, rode on the back of a
speculative bubble, and managed to double the size of the venture capital industry by

1999. 40
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An increase in both the amount of new business plans as well as the amount of
capital to finance each plan, led to a surge in the amount of companies receiving venture
capital financing. Instead of nurturing each of these companies by watching its growth
and capital expenditures, venture capitalists pumped money into each new investment
jamming financing rounds closer and closer together and brining each new company to
IPO in a shorter amount of time. And while it would only seem logical that the less
attention paid to each new financing would lead venture capitalists to bestow lower
valuations on these companies, the exact opposite happened. As the bubble began to gain
momentum so too did the size of potential growth for companies in the Information
Technology industry. As discussed earlier, the new valuation methods must have altered
from the techniques of the past, as heavily weighted variables for pre-money valuations
proved to have little magnitude in increasing a company's value. Rather, it appears that
venture capitalists had obtained pre-money valuations by looking both at the value of the
company to its consumer as well as the company's potential for growth based on
speculative industry and market dynamics.
It appears, however, that this valuation method did not provide high enough pre
money valuations for market investors. The IPOs of the late 1990s were consistently
followed by large surges in the companies' stock market prices, suggesting that the
investing public believed the companies to be undervalued and under priced. And while
it appears that the monetary size of the industry, the previous two-quarter NASDAQ
behavior, and the new pre-money valuations had an impact on driving up these
valuations. some other behavioral effect must have also been at work.

According to

Cassidy, this factors was an attempt by venture capitalists and investment bankers to
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"justify the pnces investors were paying" for many of the lnfonnation Technology
companies. 41 As a means of justification, "Wall Street analysts looked at their current
growth rates and extrapolated them into the indefinite future.,,42 The major problem with
this behavior is that their "valuation method conveniently ignored the fact that the high
growth rates were themselves a product of the stock market's rise,"

43

therefore if

anything were to happen to the market, such as the bubble bursting, the companies would
falter and eventually disappear.

All evidence and results point towards this result,

leading this paper to conclude that an alteration in venture capital investment behavior,
caused by surges to its supply and demand for capital as well as surges in investor
demand for Infonnation Technology companies, led to an increase in financing these
companies. By increasing the amount of companies financed in a particular industry as
well as paying liltle attention to their growth prior to IPO. the venture capitalists saturated
a market with companies who were poorly modeled and over-valued on speculative
infonnation.

41

41

43
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Appendix

Table A-l: Variable Definitions
Equation

Defmition
a dummy variable equal to one for those companies receiving their first round
of financing the 1996 Telecommunications Deregulation Act
e avera e time between each financi" round for each com an
a dununy variable equal to one for those companies in the broadcasting
industry
ual to the
ital ains tax rate
a dummy variable equal to one for those companies in the connectivity
roducts industry
m an' size as measured by- the amount of en~loyees
a dummy variable equallo one for those companies in the cable service
provider indus
e difference of the logarithm of a company's stock price one day after
_-t~.;;;..d""ing from the logarithm of its initial offer rice
the difference of the logarithm of a company's stock price oDe week after
ding from the logarithm of its initial offer price
e difference of the logarithm of a company's stock price one month after
ading from the logarithm of its initial offer p'rice
dummy variable equal to oDe for those companies in the fiberoptics or
h~tonics industry
e level ofthe real gross domestic product during the quarter when a
m
rived its first v
ca i financin round
e monetary amount ofvenrure capital financing in a company's industry at
"",,":e_tlm_"
_e of its initial 2ub1ic offering:;
-:- _-.,...-,.._
dummy variable equal to ODe for those companies in the internet service
rovider indus
e monetary amount of venture capital financing a company received before
its initial public offering
e percent change in the NASDAQ composite calculated using a two quarter
lag
_

----------1

-------1

industrysizeipo
ispdummy
monbefipo

atentsgranted
remonval
remoDvalresid2
rofitable

sizefrndrais4
elevconfdum
tspdummy
ireequipduDl
wspdurnmy

the lotal amount of companies in the sample receiving their fl1"St round of
venrure capital flOaecing in a given quarter
e amount of patents granted by the government in the year that the company
eDt to initial ublic offerin
the pre-money valuation of a company calculated before its initial public
offering
e unexplained variations in uation 2
dummy variable equal to one for those companies generating profits at the
time of initial public offering
e total amount of venture capital invested in first round financings one
uarter rior
e total amounl of venture capital invested in first round financings in this
uarter
dummy variable equal to one for those companies in the
elelvideoconferencing services and equipment industry
............_----"---------1
dummy variable equal to one for those companies in the telecommunications
service rov-ider industry
dummy variable equal to one for those companies in the wireless
ommunications e ui ment indus
a dummy variable equal «) one for those companies in the wireless service
rovider indus
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Table A-2: List of Companies in Sample

Innova
erican Radio Systems
adio One
edialink Worldwide
mulus Media
iBeam Broadcasting
Regent Communications
dio Unica Communications
CME Communications
lassie Communications
@Entertainment
WorldGate Communications
igh Speed Access
otify
ranswitch
CT Networks
helon
Interlink Computer Sciences
dvanced Fibre Communications
etstar
Socket Communications
armonic Lightwaves
CP Clare
Premisys Communications
Sync Research
ylan
araUon Communications
ybrid Networks
Extreme Networks
oundry Networks
igital Transmission Systems
Solopoint
uniper Networks
edback Networks
isual Networks
acketeer
Carrier Access
Verilink
Gadzoox Networks
vici Systems
Vina Technologies
rossroads Systems
itecb Communications
etwork Engines
teon Websystems
owPoint Communications
ccelerated Networks
Cobalt Networks
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IPO Date
8/8/1997
6/8/1995
5/5/1999
1/30/1997
6/26/1998
5/18/2000
1/25/2000
10/19/1999
9/29/1999
12n/1999
7/31/1997
4/15/\999
6/4/1999
8/14/1996
8/28/1997
6/14/1995
5/3/1995
7/2811998
8/15/1996
9/30/1996
9119/1995
6/6/1995
5/22/1995
6120/1995
4/5/1995
11/9/1995
3/11/1996
6/12/1996
11/12/1997
4/8/1999
9/27/1999
3/4/1996
8/611996
6124/1999
5/18/1999
2/611998
7/27/1999
7/31/1998
6/10/1996
7/19/1999
7/28/2000
8/1012000
10/19/1999
6/9/1999
7/1312000
9124/1999
3/31/2000
6/23/2000
11/4/1999

Com an
5 Networks
Sonus Networks
urnstone Systems
Somera Communications
etwork Access Solutions
dvanced Switching Communications
CoSine Communications
Accord Networks
ugment Systems
CIENA
Vixel
eUium
E-Tek Dynamics
ONI Systems

IPO Date
6/4/1999
5/25/2000
1131/2000
11/12/1999
6/4/1999
10/5/2000
9126/2000

6/2912000
5/13/1997
2/7/1997
10/1/1999
5/17/2001
12/211998
6/1/2000

21412000,
Corvis
Sycamore Networks
ewFocus
Oplink Communications
iance Fiber Optic Products
igex
erformance Systems International
ilot Network Services
Technologies, Inc.
tHorne
Verlo
iaWorks
anhLink Network
igital Island
Net-Works
terNAP Network Services
RIC Communications
Internet Telephony Exchange Carrier
etZero
uno Online Services
Fastnet
First Virtual
olycom
Latitude Communications
ideoserver
CI
. rooks Fiber Properties
ncentric Network
SN Communications
Star Telecommunications
NVInc.
ITC DeltaCom
resCom Inlernational
Deal Communications
teSS Communications
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7/28/2000
10/21/1999
5/18/2000
ll/l1/1999
10/412000
ll/2l/2000
10/161l 99
5/1/1995
8/11/1998
5/25/1995
7/1 III 997
5/1211998
8/3/2000
1/2211997
6/29/1999
211l/2000
9/29/1999
12/14/1999
9/27/1999
9/23/1999
5126/1999
218/2000
4/29/1998
4/29/1996

517/1999
5/24/1995
4/3/1997
5/2/1996
8/1/1997
2/4/1998
6/12/1997
11123/1999
10/24/1997

2nJJ996
7/28/1999
219/2000

Com an

IPODate

Global Telesystems
GC Communications
ythms NetConnections
orthPoint Communications
legiance Telecom
Covad Corrununications
lied Riser Communications
elocity
DSL.net
el.2Phone
Choice One Communications
Tel Technologies
P-Com
elaxis Communications
. et Communications
epeater Technologies
Endwave
etro
owerwave Technology
Corsair Communications
ata Critical
GlobeComm
etawave Communications
ritoo Network Systems
oad
Stanford Microdevices
ovatel Wireless
CeUnet Data SysteOJS
Pagemart Wireless
ireless One
e1ecorp PCS
Preferred Networks
dvanced Radio Telecom
SpectraLink
. gate Wireless
Crown Castle International
rite I
estern Wireless
o mnip oint
riton PCS
OmniSky
GoAmerica

2/5/1998
5/12/1998
4/6/1999
5/5/1999
7/1/1998

112211999
11/1 0/1999
10/28/1999
3/29/2000
10/6/1999
7/29/1999
211612000
12/15/1999
3/2/1995
2/1/2000
12/6/1999
8/912000
10/17/2000
8/18/1999

121611996
7/3011997
11/9/1999
8/8/1997
412712000
71J31200
9/29/2000
512512000
11/16/200
9/26/1996
6/13/1996
10/18/1995
1112211999
212711996
11/5/1996
4/26/1996
9127/1999
8/18/1998
12113/1999

5/2211996
1125/1996
10/27/1999
9/21/2000
4/7/2000
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Table A-3:

lDependent Variable: log(numbfundsrais4)
Sample: I 136
Variable

Coefficient

Constant

-0.696***

Afterdereg

-0.124

Capgainstax

-0.798·**
0.0029***

YCPstart
Sizefundprev4

0.0029·"

Sizefundrais4
Adjusted R

2

0.006***
0.521

F-staristic
30.38
If" tban c<.1 0 on two-tail tesc • If ** than .05<t<.1 0 on two-tail tesC
If"· than t< .01 on two taUtesT
.1
YCPstart = the corporate tax rate in quaner when investment first financed.
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